Toward robot ethics through the ethics of autism by Shibata Masayoshi
 1




1.  Why must autonomous robots be moral? 
 
1-1.   What does autonomy mean for robots? 
The aim of this paper is to present an ethical landscape for humans and autono-
mous robots in the future of a physicalistic world, which will touch mainly on a frame-
work of robot ethics rather than concrete ethical problems possibly caused by recent 
robot technologies.  It seems that we could not find sufficient answers to such ethical 
problems as occurring to future military robots unless we understand what autonomy in 
autonomous robots exactly implies for robot ethics.  This paper presupposes that this 
“autonomy” should be understood as “being able to make intentional decisions from in-
ternal state, and to doubt and reject any rule”, which requires robots to have at least a 
minimal desire-belief folk psychology.  And if any agent has a minimal folk psychology, 
we would have to say that it potentially has the same “right and duties” as us with a 
full-fledged folk psychology, because ethics for us would cover any agent as far as it is 
regarded to have a folk psychology --- even in Daniel C. Dennett’s intentional stance 
(Dennett 1987).  We can see the lack of autonomy in this sense in the famous Asimov’s 
Laws cited by George A. Bekey et al. in this volume, which could be interpreted to show 
the rules any autonomous robots in the future have to obey (Bekey et al. 2010 sec.2).   
Strictly speaking, these laws are not truly the ethics for robots at all since, as I 
will argue later, they do not presuppose that robots have the same “rights and duties” 
among them, or admit that robots and humans have the same “rights and duties” 
among them.  At best they are merely “design policies” to make robots better tools for 
humans.  It is often suggested that if their contents were appropriately revised, they 
could be changed into the three rules for electrical appliances to obey, because these 
rules do not clarify to what extent those robots have autonomy.  When autonomy is 
reduced, Asimov’s Laws could be rewritten into “The Three Laws of Electrical Appli-
ances” mutatis mutandis, which correspond to e.g. (1) security (not to damage humans), 
(2) obedience (to work as humans intend them to do), and (3) toughness (not to be bro-
ken easily).  But full-fledged autonomy would conflict with an absolutely obligatory 
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rule for robots, the second rule of obedience. 
    How should we treat robots and be treated by them?  It depends on what type of 
beings we think the robots are.  As long as the robots we are considering now are au-
tonomous robots rather than mere mechanical tools such as robots working in factories, 
they are not like pets, animals, unborn babies, or the elderly with heavy dementia to 
whom we have one-sided “rights and duties”.  In a word, the ethics of robots we want to 
investigate are the ethics required for humans and robots to coexist with reciprocal re-
lations, i.e. the same “rights and duties” in a community. 
    But is it really possible that humans and robots can live together as equal members 
in a moral community?  Due to many differences of basic conditions between them, 
such as birth (production), death (destruction), cognitive abilities, physical abilities, 
appearances, reproduction, and so on, it seems implausible that such two groups could 
comprise the one and same moral community.  We can give examples of such funda-
mental differences concerning ethical issues as follows.   
First, robots could have a kind of eternal lives or iterated lives over a long period of 
time, which are made possible by the production principle of “the same design, the same 
robot” in a functionalist sense, and easy availability of their parts in our physical world.  
Their prolonged lives may endanger the common interests of goals and methods in a life 
plan between humans and robots, and thereby make it difficult to comprise a common 
moral community.  The production principle allows robots to be recreated with their 
exact physical copies without end in principle, so that they exist with exactly the same 
minds.  As I argue later, our actual world where autonomous robots are possible would 
be a physical world where the supervenience (at least, global supervenience) relations 
hold between physical properties and mental ones, which make “the same physical, the 
same mental” possible. So many robots’ minds exactly the same around us may conflict 
with a traditional concept of a person, i.e. the absolute uniqueness of a person as a 
member of a moral community, if robots could be persons. 
Second, robots seem to be able to erase or implant their memories arbitrarily.  For 
humans, the consistency and traceability of their memories, though not perfect but to a 
certain degree, is required to constitute their personhood, which robots may lack in a 
radical sense to nearly destroy robots’ personhood.  Can we punish a robot for a murder 
in spite of the complete elimination of his related memories?  Or how could we regard a 
robot’s sincere claim of his worthiness because of a disguised heroic memory of a past 
trifle action?  We may have to treat a robot with a change of memories in this radical 
sense as different members of the community every time he erases or implants an im-
portant memory.  Although it is unclear whether the psychological continuity theory of 
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personhood is right, easy changeability of memory in robots will give rise to serious 
problems about robots’ personhood. 
Third, robots do not necessarily have the same psychology as humans.  As we will 
see later, sharing our folk psychology including the ability of understanding other minds 
is essential for making reciprocal relationships with each other, which is a basis of being 
a member of a moral community.  Since psychological states are the results of physical 
and physiological needs and wants, robots and humans may not have exactly the same 
psychological states.  Although robots also need an energy supply, they do not want to 
eat bread or drink water.  They do not feel hunger or repletion, so they seem to have 
different attitudes and emotions toward food, which may result in a very different 
scheme of desire-belief psychology.  This difference may be mitigated in a higher func-
tional level, but it is not certain that the folk psychological mechanism will work suffi-
ciently for both humans and robots to form a mutual moral community. 
 
1-2.  The Ethics of Neo-Crusoe 
    Imagine that an agent is living absolutely alone in a closed area of deep space in the 
galaxy.  He is intelligent like us, but does not need any partners to survive nor have 
any missions to do.  He may be a robot or an alien unlike us in some respects.  Alt-
hough he may have a memory of his society or the community that brought him up, he 
has been alone for a long time since the collapse of his society, and will be alone this way 
until his death.  He is not a member of any community now and will not be so in the 
future. In other words, he is not actually or possibly a member of any community. 
    I will call him Neo-Crusoe.  I guess people would not envy his life, but he could live 
as he pleases every day.  There are no friends or enemies who interfere with him, or 
whom he interferes with.  In a sense Neo-Crusoe enjoys an absolute loneliness, but 
what does it mean for such an agent as Neo-Crusoe to be moral?  Or what kind of ethics 
does he need?  We will have a short remark about this question from Kantian moral 
theory and utilitarianism.  But my concern here is not to get precise interpretations of 
Kant’s, Bentham’s, or Mill’s theory.  Rather, my point is to shed light on some condi-
tions under which any agents including autonomous robots have to be moral, because 
ethics or morals do not seem to necessarily exist. 
    Immanuel Kant requires us to accept the Categorical Imperative, “So act that the 
maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle in a giving of 
universal law” (Kant 1996, 164), where “the maxim of will” means “a subjective and 
practical policy of action”.  Therefore Kant is demanding that our principle of action 
could be universalized as everyone’s principle, or that it would not involve 
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self-contradiction when universalized as a law.  The maxims that cannot be universal-
ized could not be those that tell us our duties, not because of their contents but because 
of their formal characteristics.  For example, it has been said that the maxim, “break 
your promise as you like when it becomes inconvenient for you” is unable to be univer-
salized.  Why?  If promises can always be cancelled arbitrarily by their participants, 
we cannot rely on them precisely when we want them to be fulfilled.  Namely, the 
maxim would destroy self-frustratingly the foundation of promise itself if it were uni-
versalized.  Among the constructive conditions which make the promise possible at all, 
there seems to be a condition that the participants have to fulfill it.   
    Now I want to ask a question: “Are there any maxims unable to be universalized for 
Neo-Crusoe?”  Please remember that he is not actually or possibly a member of any 
community.  He cannot do any actions that necessarily involve relationships with oth-
ers, i.e. reciprocal actions.  Because he is not a member of any community, cooperation, 
agreement, betrayal, denial, etc., are action types he is not allowed to do in principle.  
In other words, any actions he can do in this situation are the ones toward him or the 
rest of the agentless world.  Is there any reason that the maxims guiding such actions 
cannot be universalized?  The answer is No, because there is no standpoint for which 
an action is still of type A, while he is doing an action of type B, the maxim of which 
destroys the constructive conditions of actions of type A.  In such a case he simply 
changed his mind to do an action of type B, instead of continuously doing A.  In order 
for his action to be a self-frustrated action of type A, there must be other persons for 
whom it is still A.  Therefore no maxims could be distinguished from each other in 
universalizability, because there are no other persons except him.  As far as the uni-
versalizability is concerned, there is no ethical viewpoint allowing us to evaluate the 
morality of his actions performed in his closed area.  We could say that any of his ac-
tions is morally neither right nor wrong.  Ethics are not necessary and indeed they do 
not exist in the world of Neo-Crusoe, just because there is no “what one has to do” apart 
from “what one wants to do”.  Although it would be required to construct more detailed 
arguments in order to draw this conclusion from Kant’s theory when considering, in 
particular, his treatment of suicide, I think we could sustain this conclusion inde-
pendently of any Kantian arguments. 
    Let’s see next what utilitarianism will say about Neo-Crusoe’s “what has to be 
done”.  Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism of “the greatest happiness of the greatest 
numbers is the foundation of morals and legislation” is recast in John Stuart Mill’s “the 
Principle of Utility” as follows:  “The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, 
Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion 
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as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to promote the reverse of hap-
piness.” (Mill 1969, 212).  Because Neo-Crusoe is the only person existing in his world, 
“the greatest numbers” in the Principle of Utility could only mean “one person”, i.e. him 
alone.  Without further arguments, it seems evident that whatever actions he may 
plan to do, there is no “what he has to do” imposed on him contrary to “what he wants to 
do” as long as he does not intentionally perform actions spoiling his own happiness.  
And it is certain that he would not intentionally do actions harmful to his happiness.  
It does not mean that he is always the best judge of his own future happiness. It is suf-
ficient for him to not violate the Principle of Utility that he is the best judge at the 
present time of his own future happiness, as far as this Principle is a guide of his ac-
tions. 
    Of course Neo-Crusoe may accidentally invite unhappy results from his actions 
because of his cognitive failures or bad performances.  He may have a strong desire 
suddenly to touch a green shining stone beside him or climb a steep mountain in the 
distance, which may occasionally result in bad outcomes for him.  But does it imply 
that he should not have done it?  If certain external causes prevented him from doing 
that action, he would be disappointed seriously and his happiness would be reduced 
considerably.  Even in a case of his regretting his action because of bad consequences, 
did his regret have any ethical perspectives?  If we say that he did a morally wrong 
action when he brings an unhappy result only to himself by doing an action involving no 
other members of the community, there seems to be something peculiar in this judg-
ment.  Let us remember again Neo-Crusoe’s situation.  Even if utilitarian calculation 
of his happy and unhappy consequences says something about his actions’ morality, it is 
mere calculation without a more basic moral intuition implicitly expressed in the 
phrase of “greatest number” in the Principle of Utility.  This is because the Principle 
shows up only when agents need to have relations with others.  One of the presuppo-
sitions of the Principle of Utility is that agents are such creatures that are bound to 
pursue the greatest happiness.  Therefore such a lonely agent as Neo-Crusoe satisfies 
vacuously the Principle of Utility in all his actions because the actions of agents have to 
be adjusted to one another only when there are plural agents and they come to be nec-
essarily concerned with others’ interests.  The Principle of Utility is a guide to this 
adjustment.  We could say it is to mistake the means for the end to evaluate the mo-
rality of one’s actions in spite of there being no others in the community.  The above 
shows that there is no “what he has to do” distinguished from “what he wants to do” for 
Neo-Crusoe at least in the utilitarian guidance of his actions. 
    All I was going to suggest in this section is that there are no ethics for such a being 
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as Neo-Crusoe.  Although the above is not a decisive argument, we could say now 
whatever action he does is morally neither right nor wrong.  For him, what has to be 
done is nothing other than what is desired to be done. This means that agents have 
their ethics only if there are other members belonging to the same community who 
could have the same “duties and rights” among them.  I will call this “the community 
condition” of ethics.  This condition is not sufficient but necessary for ethics to come 
into existence for the world of agents.  If there had been no “what one has to do” cut off 
from “what one wants to do” for an extremely long time even for all members of the 
same community, I think their world would be morally a best one for all of them.  In 
the sense that for one to be able to do what he wants to do is a freedom in a primitive 
form, ethics are required only for somehow avoiding collisions among agents’ freedom to 
do “what one wants to do”.  Viewing the ethics as “deprivation of freedom”, it seems to 
me that the most respectable value in the ethical context is Libertarian Freedom. Here 
Libertarian Freedom should not to be understood as implying “free will without any 
cause” in a metaphysical sense, but “free choice without any constraint” in a political 
sense (Cf. J. Greene and J. Cohen 2004). 
 
2.  Natural Conditions for Humans to Be Moral 
 
2-1.   A Physical World Where Autonomous Robots Are Possible 
    What is a physical world where we can make autonomous robots?  In spite of a lot 
of arguments in the contemporary arena of philosophy of mind, let me skip the compli-
cated issues to a minimal version of physicalism because I think that kind of world must 
be a physicalistic world, i.e. a world where some version of physicalism is true.  In fact, 
robot ethics is one of the most difficult moral problems that will be raised by the essen-
tial features of a physicalistic world in the future.  Ignoring the details, minimal 
physicalism consists of the following two assertions: 
(1) Any individual is identical to some physical individual (that is, there are no souls or 
spirits as non-physical individuals). 
(2) Any property supervenes on some physical property, even if the identity relation 
between them does not hold (that is, if physical properties as subvenient properties 
are the same, mental properties corresponding to them are necessarily the same).  
According to minimal physicalism, our world is a world where once the physical facts 
are fixed, all other facts that are characterized as non-physical are determined.  For 
example, the same type of brain state necessarily corresponds to the same type of psy-
chological state, and a same type of physical movement in the same type of environment 
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necessarily corresponds to the same type of action.  Notoriously, the local superveni-
ence relation does not hold between mental states and brain states, when the former is 
characterized and classified in folk psychological concepts and terms.  But if we take as 
a subvenient basis a sufficiently large spatiotemporal region of the physical world in-
cluding brains in question, almost all physicalists would admit that the supervenience 
relation holds (i.e. the global supervenience).  So keeping this reservation in our mind, 
we could roughly assert of the supervenience between mental and physical properties 
the following relation: for the realization of a psychological state “I have to go to the 
airport now” it is sufficient for a type of corresponding brain state to occur.  And this 
relation does not allow that although two brains are physically of the same type, the one 
is realizing a psychological state “I have to go to the airport now”, the other “I want to 
make an omelet” (Cf. Kim 1993).   
    But in so far as robots are made technologically from various hard materials rather 
than neurons or hormones, it is not possible that robots have the same type of brain 
state as humans.  Does it mean that robots cannot have the same type of psychological 
state or belong to the same moral community as humans?  Fortunately the superven-
ience relation allows multiple realizations.  That is, the same type of psychological 
state can be realized by many different kinds of physical states.  If you are a reductive 
physicalist like Jaegwon Kim, you have to read the term “same” as “similar” in the 
previous sentence, but here we will not go deep into the difference between them, be-
cause it matters only in the context of psychological laws.  What remains as “the same” 
in the multiple realizations is a function fulfilled in different ways by different mecha-
nisms of a lower level.  Indeed it is a precondition for us to produce artificial intelli-
gence or robots to have a conviction that we could make beings artificially which could 
act in almost “the same” way as we do, because without it there would be no serious 
efforts leading to the recent flood of various robots.  We have been given “ontological 
supports” by these multiple realizations every time various functions of humans imi-
tated artificially are extended to new territories. 
   But robots seem to have one worry.  The multiple realizations can be endorsed by a 
robust argument as far as they are concerned with the functions realized by causal 
mechanism, but there is room for a lot of controversy concerning qualia, or conscious-
ness as an applied problem of “philosophical zombie” (Cf. Chalmers 1996).  For exam-
ple, if it is true that robots do not feel any pleasure or pain at all in spite of fulfilling the 
same functions as humans, what kind of justification do we have to regard them as 
subsumed under the Principle of Utility?  Here rational beings without sensations 
(robots) may seem to give rise to a different problem from one caused by sentient beings 
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without rationality (animals) with regard to the membership of moral community. 
    But there is good news for robots in the ethical context. If the actual world is one 
that allows us to make functionally isomorphic robots to humans, the problem whether 
robots are “zombie robots” without qualia has the same structure of argument as the 
philosophical problem of other minds, which seems to be unsolvable as a purely epis-
temological problem.  As the question of how to know directly other minds beyond ex-
ternal evidence could lead to skepticism regarding other minds; the question of how to 
be certain about the existence of qualia or consciousness in robots could not be given any 
decisive answer.  In a nutshell, robots occupy the same epistemological position as 
humans in this regard.  But in our context of ethics, it is highly important that we have 
built up a moral community in spite of the skepticism of other minds. That is, our rea-
son to make others members of the moral community is not the epistemological con-
firmation of mental states of others, but the practically motivated ontological decisions.  
    Therefore, although it remains a philosophically important question whether func-
tionally isomorphic robots to humans have the “same” qualia or phenomenological con-
sciousness as humans, it does not have any significant impacts on the problem whether 
robots and humans could make a common moral community.  I think the more prob-
lematic issue is how to construct a common moral community when robots have supe-
rior rather than isomorphic functions to humans. 
 
2-2.   Humans in a Physicalistic World 
    Let us take a brief look at what will happen to humans in such a physicalistic world 
as makes various functional robots possible. The key word here is “enhancement beyond 
therapy”.  My concern is in the situation where the natural conditions making our 
community possible will considerably change by humans’ coming to be cyborgs and 
producing many robots around them, and thereby endanger the “existence conditions” of 
our usual community making our usual ethics possible. 
The purpose of enhancement which is becoming a big problem today in the fields of 
medicine, law, morality, and so on is to reinforce a variety of functions of humans in 
various ways, and to make humans live for a longer and longer time with the health and 
strength of youth (finally, to attain perennial youth and immortality).  All biological 
phenomena are determined by physical phenomena in a physicalistic world so that in 
principle any phenomena could be realized if those are physically realizable.  But of 
course all phenomena of each level are governed by the laws of each level.  So it is ev-
ident that the possible transfiguration (as enhancement) of humans as biological beings 
has a limit.  I am not sure now, but this limitation might mean for humans one more 
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step in their evolution from biological existence, who have been changing their pro-
tein-based forms, to mechanical existence that will have poured their consciousness into 
robots.  In other words, humans might change into robots together with their minds 
and consciousness in the remote future.  It does not mean that humans will be cyborgs, 
nor that humans’ mind and consciousness is a mere program that could be installed in 
any suitable hardware, but that humans will have minds in robots’ brains as one of 
multiple realizations and bodies as bases for their experiences in the environment.  
Although this image needs more detailed stories, I cannot present them here because of 
my inadequate knowledge about the relations among humans, robots, and their evolu-
tions. 
      Anyway, keeping that limitation in mind, we will see a couple of imaginable re-
sults of our enhancement today.  First, when the enhancement goes “beyond therapy”, 
it certainly takes a direction toward the fundamental improvement of the state requir-
ing cures.  For example, after giving effective medicines to people suffering from de-
mentia, we will try to reproduce or reorganize the neural circuits in their brains.  Also 
in the case of mental diseases and developmental disorders including ASD (autism 
spectrum disorders), neuromodulators, such as oxytocin, are being suggested as a pos-
sible treatment (Neumann 2008, Insel 2010). Furthermore, if possible, we may choose 
surgical operations on particular parts of brains once we find the neural causes of those 
diseases in them someday.  Naturally, biomedical treatment will extend to embryos 
and fetuses through DNA-based diagnostics to prevent mothers from giving birth to 
babies having such birth defects as Down’s syndrome by using genetic technologies 
(Barnbaum 2008, ch.4, Autism and Genetic Technologies).  The goal we will reach from 
here “beyond therapy” is that every parent will have “more desirable babies”, or “perfect 
babies” who will have such desirable characteristics as higher intelligence and physical 
abilities than usual, more excellent figures and appearances than usual, a strong will, 
fine sensibility, honesty, brightness, and so on (Kass 2003, ch.2, Better Children).  
Normal “imperfect adults” already being in our society are not exceptions in this regard.  
Everyone would want to transform oneself into a “perfect man/woman” ordinarily by 
taking biomedical treatments to prevent the decline of muscles, preserve immune sys-
tems, overcome lifestyle-related diseases, and improve his/her physical appearance.  It 
must be certain that we would finally aim at the perfect avoidance of aging, i.e. the 
endless prolongation of a lifetime by making thorough use of advanced genetic tech-
nologies.   
As a result there will appear completely new “natural conditions”, or “survival 
conditions” humans have never yet experienced.  Taking cognitive abilities as an ex-
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ample, it is highly probable that everyone will become a brilliant individual or a genius.  
Certainly such high cognitive abilities are not so stereotyped, but their differences will 
seem to be restricted within a smaller range. The case is essentially the same with 
people’s figures and appearances, too.  Making a caricature of this situation, our world 
is overflowing with geniuses who are handsome men or beautiful ladies.  Although the 
concept of “perfect humans” does not necessarily mean one and the same set of proper-
ties for each person, it is sure that we will have nearly all very similar humans around 
us.  Because, as a Russian novelist once said, though the reasons why people are un-
happy are different, the reason why they are happy is identical.  In a word, we may be 
faced with a completely new circumstance in which our concepts of personal uniqueness, 
endeavor, achievement, superiority to others, or goal and happiness in life will change 
their meanings considerably.  This possibility may appear to some people disgusting, to 
some worrisome, and to others welcoming. 
    Herbert L. A. Hart explained a reason why, “given survival as an aim, law and 
morals should include a specific content” (Hart 1961, 189).  The minimum content of 
the ethics we have now is derived from the natural conditions that are contingently 
imposed on humans.  In other words, our natural conditions require a definite set of 
rules for us to survive, which constitute our minimal laws and morals, without which we 
“could not forward the minimum purpose of survival which men have in associating 
with each other” (ibid.).  Hart specifies these natural conditions as follows (ibid. 190ff.): 
 
(ⅰ) Human vulnerability.  “The common requirements of law and morality consist 
for the most part not of active services to be rendered but of forbearances, which are 
usually formulated in negative form as prohibitions”.  This reflects “the fact men are 
both occasionally prone to, and normally vulnerable to, bodily attack”. 
(ⅱ) Approximate equality.  “Men differ from each other in physical strength, agil-
ity, and even more in intellectual capacity”.  But “no individual is so much more pow-
erful than others, that he is able, without co-operation, to dominate or subdue them for 
more than a short period”. 
(ⅲ) Limited altruism.  “Men are not devils dominated by a wish to exterminate 
each other. …But if men are not devils, neither are they angels; and the fact that they 
are a mean between these two extremes is something which makes a system of mutual 
forbearances both necessary and possible”. 
(ⅳ) Limited resources.  “Human beings need food, clothes, and shelter”.  And 
“these do not exist at hand in limitless abundance; but scarce, have to be grown or won 
from nature, or have to be constructed by human toil.  These facts alone make indis-
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pensable some minimal form of the institution of property …, and the distinctive kind of 
rule which requires respect for it”. 
(ⅴ) Limited understanding and strength of will.  “The facts that make rules re-
specting persons, property, and promises necessary in social life are simple and their 
mutual benefits are obvious. …On the other hand, neither understanding of long-term 
interest, nor the strength or goodness of will, …are shared by all men alike”.  Therefore 
“… submission to the system of restraints would be folly if there were no organization 
for the coercion of those who would then try to obtain the advantages of the system 
without submitting to its obligation. ….Given this standing danger, what reason de-
mands is voluntary co-operation in a coercive system”. 
 
    These conditions are at most the contingent ones on which humans have been de-
pending rather than the necessary ones humans have to accept.  Therefore, as we have 
already seen, there is a possibility that these conditions will change considerably in our 
physicalistic world.  At least, robots are going to overcome these natural constraints 
without difficulty.  What type of ethics is needed then?  In order to make it clear to a 
small extent in the next section, let me take one of the conditions that make our current 
ethics possible in the way as we have them now.  Hart’s five conditions suggest a rea-
son why we need the ethics we have now.  What will be suggested in the ethics of ASD 
(Autism Spectrum Disorders) in the next section is “understanding of other minds” as 
one of the conditions upon which the ethics we have now become possible. 
 
3.   The Ethics of ASD (Autism Spectrum Disorders) 
 
3-1.   Theory of Mind Matters 
    Although there has been much research on ASD and its cause, including genetic 
related causes, no definitive answer has yet been found.  As is widely known, it is sa-
lient that ASD does not show a single symptom, but makes a spectrum (a wide range of 
continuous syndrome) from the type of delay of spoken language or intellectual deficits 
to that of Asperger’s syndrome, which occasionally show “islets of ability”, special tal-
ents and abilities reaching to a Nobel Prize class (James, 2006)(1).  Here I will argue 
the possibility of the common ethics between extremely different beings, following 
mainly a remarkable book, The Ethics of Autism, published by Deborah R. Barnbaum 
in 2008.  We will see that if robots and humans could build up a common moral 
community, robots would have to have at least “theory of mind” abilities, and that if 
both could build up a common community at all, there should be mutual conditions 
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under which it is possible.  But at the same time, we will be troubled by the fact that 
we could not easily find the mutual conditions due to potential tremendous differences 
between their ways of being.   
It is for us the most important characteristic of people with ASD that some of them 
do not seem to be able to recognize intentional states of other people as different from 
their own states.  It is often said that although some autistic people, unlike psycho-
paths, are not indifferent to others’ predicaments once they are told of such situations, 
they could not see through others’ emotional states at all.  It seems natural to regard 
this deficit as a malfunction of the so-called “theory of mind”.  According to this view, 
some autistic people have trouble ascribing intentional states to others or falsely ascribe 
their own states to others, because their theory of mind could not function adequately.  
In any case, many of the autistic cannot pass the false belief tests, which are now very 
famous in various contexts (2).  Of course the problem is not restricted only to beliefs.  
For someone to recognize that others have minds is recognizing that others are different 
persons from him/her, and that they have their own independent mental states, in-
cluding all kinds of intentional and non-intentional mental states such as desires, 
preferences, worries, and emotions.  In the following discussions, among various types 
and degrees of ASD, we will focus on the type of ASD with serious problems of “theory of 
mind”.  
    It is not only “the theory of mind” thesis that purports to explain this unique char-
acter of ASD.  As Barnbaum explains, we have also “the weak central coherence” thesis 
and “the weak executive function” thesis, roughly speaking, the former of which seems 
to present a better explanation of why some people with ASD often adhere to meaning-
less parts rather than the meaningful whole, and the latter a better explanation of why 
they are often preoccupied with stereotyped and repetitive motions, each compared with 
“the theory of mind” thesis.  But as Barnbaum says, these three theses do not contra-
dict one another, because each of them is merely “re-describing” the properties of ASD 
by presupposing the hypothetical cognitive functions from each perspective rather than 
giving a consistent explanation of the causal mechanism of ASD.  In this sense, we 
could say that “the theory of mind” thesis best re-describes the essential features of 
some people with ASD, and that theory of mind greatly matters in relationships with 
others, although it is still unclear how to make brain-based autonomous robots with 
non-autistic minds. 
 
3-2.   ASD and Membership in the Moral Community 
    What do ethics mean for the people who could not truly understand that others 
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have their own mental lives or recognize what these lives are?  This kind of question 
could be discussed as a problem of membership in the moral community; what proper-
ties are necessary and sufficient for any being to be a “person”, a member of the com-
munity?  In other words, could that type of persons with ASD belong to the same moral 
community as a non-autistic person?  Barnbaum, after examining and accepting with 
some reservations the arguments from Martha, C. Nussbaum, Thomas S. Scanlon, 
Derek Parfit, and Robert M. Veatch, rejects clearly the most extreme proposal presented 
by Piers Benn. The arguments about membership in a moral community logically imply 
that once the necessary conditions for membership were determined, individuals or 
groups who do not satisfy them would be expelled from the community.  Benn is pre-
cisely arguing that some people with ASD should be excluded from the moral commu-
nity of non-autistic people.  According to Barnbaum, Benn’s argument makes it a nec-
essary condition for membership in the moral community that “a good human life and 
well-being” consists in “relations that persons have with other persons” (Barnbaum 
2008, 93).  But autistic persons of that type fail to satisfy this condition because they 
could not take “intentional stance” toward others due to a lack of theory of mind.  
Certainly they are biologically humans, but they are neither person in a moral sense, 
nor located within our moral community.  In Benn’s terminology, only those who can 
possess “participant reactive attitudes” can be “proper objects of such attitudes” of oth-
ers, but some autistic people could not take the “reactive attitudes” to others (Benn 1999 
33).  Reactive attitudes as Benn understands them are emotions such as anger, frus-
tration, or preference, so it would be absurd if they were directed at objects that cannot 
have anger or preference.  “If a hurricane destroys your house, it does not make sense 
to get angry at the hurricane, because hurricanes do not get angry themselves” (Barn-
baum 2008, 94).  Some people with ASD could not take appropriate reactive attitudes 
because of a lack of theory of mind, even if they are faced with emotional situations.  
But according to Benn, only those who can have reactive attitudes and be objects of re-
active attitudes are members of the moral community.  Therefore some of autistic 
persons (or robots without theory of mind, either?) are not members of the moral com-
munity. 
    What is the reason that Barnbaum rejects Benn’s argument?  It seems to be es-
sentially a consequentialist one.  To cut that type of autistic person off from the 
non-autistic is to cut the non-autistic off from the autistic at the same time.  The result 
of this is a possible “performance of morally wrong actions”, and “an erosion of the moral 
status of the autistic and non-autistic alike”.  “The moral standing of anyone is dam-
aged whenever that person affirms that some other human being is disqualified from 
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moral consideration”.  Therefore “we should continue to be as inclusive as possible 
when determining who should count as a member of the moral community, because the 
costs are so high if we are wrong”(ibid. 102).  
   But this seems nothing other than a “selfish reason” that we want to avoid evil con-
sequences that might visit us due to the essential reciprocity of moral considerations.  
Here Barnbaum says it is acceptable.  Although her argument for this is very inter-
esting, lastly, it seems evident that what makes the “selfish reason” persuasive is the 
natural condition that both autistic and non-autistic people belong to the same biologi-
cal category of human beings, and share so many ordinary interests and lives.  By the 
same token, she seems never to think of including animals such as birds, fish, or live-
stock among members of the moral community.  Of course robots are never occurring to 
her mind.  In other words, what determines the widest range of our moral community 
is, roughly speaking, the five contingent natural conditions Hart indicated earlier.  But, 
as we will see in the next section, she thinks that these natural conditions cannot pro-
vide ethics which are applicable to both that type of autistic and non-autistic people 
equally, because the differences which divide them are so profound and their worlds are 
so distinct from each other, even if they abide with the same conditions.  If those nat-
ural conditions are not sufficient for ethics that could cover both sides, what would be 
the ground for both to comprise a common moral community?  Furthermore, taking 
into account of the fact that there could not be even mutual natural conditions shared 
by humans and robots because robots could easily stray far from Hart’s natural condi-
tions, unfortunately we would have to say that it is more difficult to find or invent ethics 
for robots than ethics for ASD.   
 
3-3.   ASD and Moral Theories 
    In order to find ethics which could cover both that type of autistic and non-autistic 
people equally, Barnbaum asks “what ethical theory is applicable to both?”, instead of 
“what ethical theory is right?”.  Her strategy means that if no one could know what a 
true moral theory requires because of a lack of adequate cognitive abilities, that would 
violate a moral axiom, “Ought implies Can”, even if there were such a true theory.  In 
that case, since no one in the moral community could know the distinction between 
right and wrong actions defined by that theory, its lessons would be impractical for 
them.  Generally speaking, from evidence available, it has been doubted that some 
persons with ASD have a moral sense, they could understand moral dilemmas, and that 
they could distinguish moral questions from other questions.  It is believed that they 
might have moral blindness. Namely, it is doubted that there are any practical moral 
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theories for them.  And if the case turned out to be tragic for that type of people with 
ASD, there would be no moral theory for them to obey by their own choice. 
    Barnbaum concludes that neither Humean, nor Kantian theories work for some 
autistic persons because of their mental peculiarities.  According to her, the story is the 
same concerning Jonathan Dancy’s moral particularism and W. D. Ross’s prima facie 
duties.  The possibility of finding moral theories shared by that type of autistic and 
non-autistic people is rather low.  What peculiarities of ASD would hinder moral theo-
ries from being adapted to the autistic?  In what follows, we will see only a part of her 
arguments about Hume and Kant (ibid. 114ff.). 
     As Barnbaum points out, for Hume, morality is more felt than judged, and moral-
ity is determined by sentiment.  One particular emotion, sympathy, is the core of 
Hume’s idea of morality.  But sympathy or empathy requires one’s recognition that 
others have their own intentional states, and that these states can be different from 
one’s own.  This means not only holding a belief about others but also recognizing a 
belief others have.  But it is this barrier that some people with ASD could not overcome 
because of their lack of theory of mind.  We have now two explanations of how we gain 
access to others’ mental states, the first of which, the “theory” theory, asserts that we 
predict others’ mental states in question by adopting “theory of mind” to them, and the 
other, the simulation theory insists that we make up in our own minds, by simulation, 
the mental state that we would have if we were in that situation instead of others in 
question, and then transfer that state to them.  Whichever theory will turn out to be 
true, the problem remains the same for people lacking a theory of mind because they 
could not use either mechanism.  In particular, they could not naturally have sympa-
thy or empathy with others.  This deficiency results in moral indifference in Hume’s 
idea of morality.  In a word, “without this feeling, an agent would be unable to act 
rightly or wrongly according to Hume’s moral theory” (ibid. 120). 
    On the other hand, Kant’s theory may seem to be applicable to people lacking a 
theory of mind just because it recommends us to reject emotions like sympathy in order 
to do morally right actions.  In fact, Kant thinks that actions have moral worth only 
when they are done from duty, and that this is guaranteed by the recognition that this 
action is the one which duty demands, rather than by emotional motivations such as 
love, sympathy, or pity.  Furthermore, Kant even dismisses these emotions as no help 
to do morally right actions.  Therefore even that type of autistic people, who have a 
serious problem of sympathy with others (hot methodology), could choose a morally 
right action by following the recognition of duty in each situation, if they adapt Kant’s 
theory (cold methodology), which thinks much of “rule following” aspects.  But accord-
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ing to Barnbaum, the case is not so easy.  For example, at least some versions of Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative are not workable for that type of autistic people because of a 
lack of theory of mind.  One of those versions says “So act that you use humanity, 
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an 
end, never merely as a means” (Kant 1996b 80).  Kant thinks that any member of the 
moral community does not exist as a mere subjective (instrumental) value for someone 
else’s end, but exists as an objective value in his /her existence itself for which all other 
beings exist.  That is, any of these members is never a means for other beings, but an 
end for him/herself.  But could that type of autistic people treat other people not as a 
means for some ends, but as ends in themselves?  To do this, it is necessary for them to 
assume that others each have their autonomous point of view, which is nothing other 
than to recognize that others have their own “ends-means” relations different from mine, 
i.e. their own intentional attitudes toward the world different from my attitudes.  As 
we have already seen so many times, however, it is extremely difficult for that type of 
autistic people to attribute intentional states different from his/hers, and, as a result, 
nearly impossible to understand that others are the starting points of their own inten-
tional states, i.e. “the ends in themselves”.  In consequence, Kant’s moral theory is 
unable to find accord with the peculiarities of some autistic people, either.  Barnbaum 
concludes “the fact that a Kantian moral theory cannot accommodate the autistic indi-
vidual may be reason for rejecting Kantian theory, not for excluding the autistic person” 
(Barnbaum 2008, 130.).  
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
4-1.   Ethics are not Programs but Attitudes 
     To resolve ethical dilemmas robots will encounter, Bekey et al. in this volume 
consider two types of approaches to the problem of programming ethics into robots 
(Bekey et al. 2010, sec.6).  The one is “top down” approaches that take seriously an 
idea that morality is a set of rules to obey in any circumstances without exceptions, 
and the other is “bottom up” approaches that try to construct morality through expe-
riences without top-down a priori ethical theories.  The former corresponds roughly to 
GOFAI (Good Old Fashioned AI) programming approaches and the latter neural net-
work approaches.  Bekey et al. rightly conclude that both are not sufficient to make 
morally autonomous robots because of the notorious “frame problem”.  Roughly 
speaking, the frame problem arises necessarily when robots without human intuitive 
cognitive abilities carry out any general directions in the real world on condition that 
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they have to consider all and only relevant important effects by their actions. “The 
frame problem is particularly acute for top-down approaches to programming, but 
persists for bottom-up approaches as well” (ibid.).  In consequence, Bekey et al. take a 
third way, i.e. a hybrid strategy of top-down and bottom-up, namely rule-following and 
experience.  This approach is characterized by them as highly related with “virtue 
ethics” (3).  “This approach understands the teaching of ethics as concerned with de-
velopment of moral character---one’s underlying dispositions or tendencies to act in a 
given situation in a given role” (ibid.).  I hope their third way, elaborated sufficiently, 
will be successful in handling robots.  But I have more fundamental worries about 
programming or teaching ethics to robots. 
      In fact, putting aside the frame problem, there are two inherent problems here.  
The one is whether we could have the true moral theory that would be programmed 
into autonomous robots, and the other is how to apply moral theories in general to real 
situations.  My speculation is that moral properties do not supervene on physical 
properties even globally, so that there is no objective truth in ethics in the sense of 
reducibility to truths caught in physical sciences.  In consequence, morality exists 
only deep in the center of belief systems of robots or humans, and there is no direct 
evidence for any moral theories in our perceptual world.  Further, since clues and 
grounds for moral decisions inevitably bring obscurities to some degree in any contexts, 
applications of moral theories to real situations are not apt for robots’ programs as a 
set of axioms and derived theorems from them.  In this regard, morality resides only 
in a holistic web of beliefs.  I cannot show detailed arguments here due to a lack of 
space, ethics are neither any rigid rule with clear “applicability conditions”, nor em-
pirical truth acquired inductively from experiences, but merely attitudes of each belief 
system toward other belief systems.  But nobody knows how to install moral attitudes 
into robots’ belief systems. 
     
4-2.   An Ethical Landscape in the Future 
But there is a harder problem in robot ethics than what has been discussed before.  
It is how to build a mutual moral community of robots and humans whose “existence 
conditions” are extremely different.  Unfortunately, I cannot give any decisive answer 
to this problem now, or even to what robot ethics or the ethics of autism would be like 
in this concern.  But let me suggest something to give the answers in the near future. 
First, as the situation of our Neo-Crusoe suggests, ethics have no meaning unless 
there is a community where one has equal “rights and duties” with others (the com-
munity condition).  And it is a result of adjustment of interests and actions of mem-
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bers within such a community that “what one has to do” arises with a different content 
from that of “what one wants to do”.  Therefore, from the point of view of “ethics as 
deprivation of freedom”, it is desirable that ethics hold “what the members of commu-
nity want to do”, i.e. their freedom of actions, in high regard as far as ethics can.  
Second, it is due to several contingent natural conditions as Hart points out that 
our present ethics have their contents as they have now.  But these natural conditions 
are really those of a physicalistic world, when we regard them as preconditions for the 
emergence of autonomous robots in the future.  It seems that these conditions are 
going to be more and more “improved”, that have been the source of our important 
values for humans, if we make use of new “natural conditions” possible in our physi-
calistic world.  The situations we have experienced until now such as “differences by 
chance”, or “uniqueness in each person” would be rendered increasingly stereotyped 
and monotonous.  Here the fundamental conditions of “approximate equality”, “lim-
ited resources”, etc. in humans may lose an important role to regulate the contents of 
our ethics and laws, and, instead of those, “perfect equality”, “unlimited resources”, etc. 
may change the meaning of life in humans, and thereby the meaning of ethics of hu-
mans, too.  But I cannot see through the results of this change now.  On the other 
hand, the “natural conditions” Hart pointed out are not serious ones for robots.  “Ap-
proximate equality” would lose the role of determining the contents of robot ethics too, 
because they may vary considerably one another in abilities, strengths, or life spans.  
What would be like the same “rights and duties” shared by humans and robots, the 
latter of whom could have at least the same mental abilities as the highest ones of 
“enhanced” humans, “less vulnerability” and more durability than humans, and 
semi-eternal “life”?   
    Third, as the peculiarities of ASD show, in order to be a member of a moral com-
munity, the most important ability robots need to have is one afforded by “theory of 
mind”, which is, generally speaking, included in folk psychology of humans. Certainly, 
the role of theory of mind seems to be a little exaggerated in Barnbaum’s arguments, 
because it sounds as though theory of mind alone makes recognition of other minds 
possible and fundamentally builds up moral attitudes.  But if robots did not have a folk 
psychological mechanism including theory of mind as its core at all, they would not 
stand in genuine reciprocal relations with other robots or humans, because the robots 
would not have “other minds” as targets of their moral considerations.  The profound 
difference between two worlds of some of autistic and non-autistic people indicates an-
ticipatorily how extremely heterogeneous “existence conditions” are among robots and 
humans.  Barnbaum could not give an answer to the problem of what contents the 
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ethics would have that could treat those two worlds morally equally.  What she showed 
is that non-autistic people should not exclude that type of autistic from the moral 
community, however difficult it is to find ethics covering the two worlds.  But, although 
her conclusion is intuitively right, her argument is not effective in regard to robots, be-
cause her argument tacitly depends on the “approximate sameness” of natural condi-
tions of the members, which cannot be expected to hold among robots and humans.   
    Finally, the last point I have arrived at is that we should make artificially anew a 
moral system which has the following characteristics rather than look for ethics de-
pending on some natural conditions as Hart pointed out.  The new system would in-
clude robots, humans, autistic people, non-autistic people, and all other groups of pecu-
liar beings, in so far as they have minimal folk psychological understandings of others.  
And these folk psychological understandings would be guaranteed by the attitudes that 
respect others as independent moral agents and by the recognition that others have 
their own independent minds and interests.  Ironically enough, the core of the new 
moral system in this robot-century would be Mill’s famous principle of “harm to others”, 
which urges that we are permitted to do anything unless it does harm to other moral 
agents, whatever purposes, desires, intentions, feelings, or preferences we have. Of 
course we have to read this principle as demanding every moral agent to respect all 




  (1) According to the fourth edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnos-
tic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-Ⅳ), a diagnosis of autism 
requires at least two signs from A, one sign each from B and C, and at least six 
signs overall as shown below. 
   A.  Qualitative impairments in reciprocal social interaction as manifested by at 
least two of the following: 
         1. impairment in multiple non-verbal behaviors such as eye-to-eye gaze and 
facial expression 
         2. failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to developmental level 
         3. lack of spontaneous seeking to share interests or enjoyments with others 
         4. lack of social or emotional reciprocity 
   B.  Qualitative impairments in communication 
         1. delay, or lack of development of spoken language 
         2. impairment in the ability to initiate or sustain conversation despite ade-
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quate speech 
         3. stereotyped and repetitive, or idiosyncratic use of language 
         4. lack of varied spontaneous pretend play or social imitative play appropriate 
to developmental level 
   C.  Restricted, repetitive, and stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests, or activi-
ties 
         1. preoccupation with one or more patterns of interest, with abnormal inten-
sity or focus 
         2. compulsive adherence to nonfunctional routines or rituals 
         3. stereotyped or repetitive motor mechanism 
         4. persistent preoccupation with parts of objects 
(2) We have several scenarios making up the false belief tests.  As Barnbaum puts it, 
according to the “Sally and Anne Test”, children are asked to consider the following 
story (Barnbaum 2008, 22).  Sally and Ann, often represented by puppets, play 
with a marble, which they put in one place, e.g. a basket.  Sally then leaves the 
room, and Ann moves the marble from the basket somewhere else e.g. into a box 
before Sally comes back.  After observing this, the test subject is asked, “Where 
will Sally look for her marble?” or, in some cases, “Where will Sally think the mar-
ble is?” (Baron-Cohen 1995, 70f.). Children with an intact theory of mind give the 
correct answer. On the other hand, autistic children often say, “Sally will look for it 
in the basket” because of their failure to understand that someone in Sally’s posi-
tion may have a false belief, while they have a true belief. 
(3) Interestingly, Barnbaum also suggested a possibility of virtue ethics as a moral the-
ory covering autistic and non-autistic people in a personal conversation with me at 
International Conference on Social Brain: Autism and Neuroethics, Kanazawa, Ja-
pan, on Mar. 24, 2010.  But the prospects of virtue ethics seem to be uncertain in 
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